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On Reason: Rationality in a World of Cultural Conflict and Racism. By Emmanuel 
Chukwudi Eze. Durham and London: Duke University Press, 2008. Pp. xx + 327.
Following his death in 2007, responses to Emmanuel Chukwudi Eze’s posthumously 
published On Reason: Rationality in a World of Cultural Conflict and Racism had a 
memorializing tone, and took place around spaces devoted to Africana Philosophy.1 
This was appropriate, given Eze’s contributions through the establishment of the jour-
nal Philosophia Africana; through editing the field-mapping Post-Colonial African 
Philosophy: A Critical Reader and On African Philosophy: An Anthology (collections 
whose Prefaces define Africana philosophy inclusively and extensively as including 
the diaspora and its engagements over time, in part because diasporic thought has 
returned to inform intellectual movements); and through a series of works that argued 
for the ongoing need to mark and counter the racism that Eze identifies as “coloring 
thought” within Enlightenment philosophy and its legacies. It would be unfortunate, 
however, if On Reason were not engaged more widely within philosophical circles, 
for while the book claims to have “quite modest” intentions (p. xi), its implications 
for philosophy in the “Postcolonial Age” are potentially far-reaching.
Eze makes a compelling if largely implicit case that the figure of “Africa” in his-
tory as a multi-sourced crossroads of thought, and as a generative site of postcolonial 
philosophy, necessitates a rethinking of the often East-West coordinates of philoso-
phy as a discipline. In the process, On Reason offers subtle reflections on Africana 
philosophy; on the question of how and where Africana philosophy’s difference 
among the family of philosophical traditions might be located (in what “nonacciden-
tal” forms of kindred thought [p. 137]); and on the persistent and irrational power of 
race to infiltrate thought in areas ranging from legal to pedagogical to medical ethics 
to the question of what constitutes philosophy. But Eze approaches these questions, 
purposively, from what seems the long way around: suggestions about how reason 
can be reconstructed for postcolonial thought follow from a thorough and technical 
breakdown of ideas about the constituent components of reason and rationality, and 
then a reconstruction through and against analyses of conceptions of reason that 
underwrite versions of colonial and postcolonial philosophy, including the Negritude 
movement.
Against what he sees as the grandiose assumptions informing these lines of 
thought, Eze proposes a model of reason based on minor, vernacular, everyday, or 
ordinary experience, and conceived of as provisionally distinct from politics and 
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r eligion. On Reason moves in alliance with postcolonial work like Gayatri spivak’s 
A Critique of Postcolonial Reason (which it never references): both Eze and spivak 
maintain that Kant “foreclose[s] the aboriginal” and Hegel “put[s] the other of Europe 
in a pattern of normative deviations”; that postcolonial thought works within the 
danger zone of its cooptation by a diverse range of political projects; and that a new 
comparativism, cautious about re-inscribing ethnocentric bias, must nourish the idea 
of a planetary Commons based on respect for the diversity of languages of thought.2 
However, On Reason holds that a genuinely philosophical approach to reason should 
avoid the pre-positioning or Marxist /feminist a priori of much cultural studies work, 
and concern itself more with resituating the postcolonial subject tactilely in history 
as a reasoning agent. Flatly rejecting the classical and continental heritage in this 
process, or skirting the need to justify its own method, would amount to an evasion 
of philosophy. Rather, to the degree that Enlightenment ideals underwrote colonial 
reason, postcolonial philosophy should wind back its premises and compose new 
modes of reckoning with time. As signaled by the book’s title/subtitle, the classical 
concerns of philosophy (“on reason”) must meet and answer to the postcolonial con-
dition (a “world of cultural conflict and racism”) at the level of concepts.
In framing his project in the Preface, “What is Rationality?” and Introduction, 
“Diversity and the social Questions of Reason,” Eze seeks to engage the central phi-
losophical problematic of the relation of particular and universal, and of the position 
of individuals within society. In ways that resist the description of African philosophy 
as a struggle to be recognized as a particular set of collective answers to p hilosophical 
universals, Eze insists that reason be reconstructed as “internally d iverse and exter-
nally pluralistic” (p. 24).3 The internal diversity that he describes as “a necessary 
condition of thinking in general” (p. 3), “goes all the way down,” percolating through 
cognitive acts and informing ordinary reason in the places where it emerges “out of 
its own historical fate” (p. 112). By external pluralism, Eze does not mean pluralism 
and multiculturalism as often debated — in fact, he regards arguments for tolerance 
and cultural comparativism as subdivisions of the logic of culturalism that press 
t oward exceptionalism or relativism. (The conversation, he insists, should be about 
the assumptions that constitute the categories, or about how the representation of 
tensions among them disclose methodological choice and generate thought).
Eze pursues universalism, but not one that can be captured “from outside of 
e veryday experience” and then, as an abstraction, reapplied (p. 10), a transcendental 
method that he presents as narcissistically sublating objects into its own system. Fur-
ther, in what Eze considers the “Afro-modern postcolonial vernacular tradition of 
thought,” philosophical work is understood as “an evolving critique of abstractions 
common in one’s society” (p. 11) in pursuit of freedom from assumptions that block 
the unfolding of individual and communal potential, through a method that appreci-
ates diversity as the fate of the world. Method is not conceived as distinct from the 
liberatory aims philosophy serves. This view requires diversity as the generative con-
dition of autonomy. Without choice there can be no exercise of reason; as in lan-
guage, where a “breech of tongues” creates an epistemic gap, the reconstructive 
pursuit of absent objects requires and enables “freedom of thought and mind” (p. 9).
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In this spirit, Eze describes reason as internally a theory with many layers and 
moving parts and externally as having infinite and changing scenes of application. 
Reason emerges both through negative critique (as the trace of what various ideas 
about reason exclude) and through a reconstructive model mindful not to attenuate 
the “affective timbre” of vernacular experience (p 46). Chapter 1, “Varieties of Ratio-
nal Experience” (the echo to James suggests the central and optimistic role the book 
assigns to the will in claiming that “humans make their own minds” [p. 84]), rotates 
and assesses the conceptions of reason that derive, in turn, from approaches labeled 
calculative and formal (Hobbes, Bacon), hermeneutical (Heidegger, Gadamer), em-
piricist (Hume), phenomenological (Husserl), transcendental (Kant), and “ordinary” 
(Lakoff and Johnson). Eze develops his preference for this last, more located, 
e mbodied, historically contingent view of reason in chapter 2, “Ordinary Historical 
Reason,” particularly in relation to language, through a discussion of varieties of 
pragmatism (Wittgenstein, Williams, Rorty, Dewey, Wiredu), enlisting Putnam’s 
t heory of disquotationality as support for “a vernacular theory of rationality and truth 
telling” (p. 119). In chapter 3, “science, Culture, and Principles of Rationality,” Eze 
shows how thinking in the shadows of race science — appealing to science based 
on anything other than the fact that DNA variance is as great within “races” as 
w ithout — disguises unreasonable methodological choices in ways that it is the task 
of the postcolonial philosopher to clarify. To say, for instance, that more attention is 
now paid to Africa within philosophy than previously is to beg the questions of “what 
exactly changed and by how much” (p. 184) and of what changes might be required 
of thought were “Africa” not positioned as philosophy’s (and history’s) other, but as 
a vital center of its production.
Chapter 4, “Languages of Time in Postcolonial Memory,” portrays the emancipa-
tory project that guided humanity away from colonial thought as both a rich answer 
to the questions above and as an incomplete project in which postcolonial philoso-
phy seeks to uproot Enlightenment-inspired “modernist” ideas of freedom from the 
philosophical grounds in which they prove tenaciously rooted and to replant them 
within a historical consciousness more “attuned to the vernacular languages of his-
tory” (p. 183). Eze posits postcolonial literature (Achebe, Thiong’o, soyinka) as a rich, 
complex field that can be harvested by philosophy in the reconstruction of its con-
cept of the reasoning subject in history. such imaginative works perform “existential 
repair” (p. 192), function as a “second handle on reality” (Achebe, quoted on p. 193), 
and, in registering the broken nature of time, norm “continuity of experience” (p. 197) 
as a human right. In facing the loss of cultural “treasures” out to the reader — in show-
ing endangered languages to be cultural repositories storing history, traditional wis-
dom, and distinctive styles of thought — the writers reveal the constant threat to all 
reality and to processes of “world renewals” (p. 213).
The attendant postcolonial anxiety that an imposed foreign reality might s ubsume 
a community’s own differs entirely in its relations in history from existentialist crises 
over language, which Eze reads in sartre’s Nausea as the running down of a view of 
reason that requires categories “powerful enough to guarantee . . . sovereignty over 
existence with all the gain in the world but at no cost to the self ” (p. 221) — a fake 
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dilemma or “egocentric phenomenology” (p. 219) that Eze reads as entirely c apitalist, 
modernist, and ethnocentric. Eze’s own humanism and pragmatism, however, lead 
him to question the countermove to re-inscribe the quasi-religious metaphysics of 
race/nation/culture, including the advocacy of essential Black difference. Eze ques-
tions the philosophical cost of this dimension of thinkers he admires greatly, such as 
senghor and Du Bois, whose work he sees as otherwise pointing to ways in which 
Africana philosophy provides a rich arena in which “agential elements in the recep-
tion or rejection” of cultural heritage are accented and modeled for postcolonial 
thought (p. 145). Eze, in other words, advocates for ordinary innovation over in-
strumental, expressive, formal, or exceptionalist forms of reason, and emphasizes 
the benefits of preserving for philosophy “an autonomous space vis-à-vis politics” 
(p. 256).
The stakes of this argument for a “conceptual division of labor” (p. 244) emerge 
most clearly in chapter 5, “Reason and Unreason in Politics,” which appeared in a 
slightly revised form in Africa Today with the title “Between History and the Gods: 
Reason, Morality, and Politics in Today’s Africa.” Here Eze contends that the pro-
cesses that inform everyday rational actions provide a better decision-making model 
than versions of reason reliant on the extraordinary or the exceptional, as well as a 
stronger answer to the primary question “To think or not to think?” that is the “the 
essence of the vernacular and practical universal” (p. 22). Reason emerges as the 
negation of its many others: radicalism, revolution, grandiosity, Manichean logic, 
sacrilization, revelation, luck, mysticism, tragic redemption through art, e motionalism, 
miracles, irrationalism, charisma, or dramatic corrective acts. social chiro-practices 
(spectacular, inaugurative adjustments) do not necessarily snap the times into joint, 
but potentially create long-term and chronic “back” problems; rather, the exercise of 
public reason as “ordinary” is more likely genuinely to transform common sense into 
good sense in terms of daily lived experience.
To reinforce this as a prescription, Eze reviews the philosophical justifications 
that guided the workings of the Truth and Reconciliation Process in south Africa, and 
shows how they problematically echo conceptions of reason in post-apartheid n ovels 
by Coetzee, Krog, and Ndebele. Eze does not consider the TRC’s settlement as neces-
sarily deficient, but finds its assumptions — including its mobilizations of the African 
concept of ubuntu (humanity) — to be, like those in the novels, overly aestheticized 
and quasi-religious — at once too much and not enough for philosophy (p. 234). He 
appreciates the senses in which, given that a strictly punitive enforcement of legal 
justice threatened the future, the settler society was guilty as a whole of crimes against 
humanity, from which it benefited materially, but could not all be incarcerated or 
expelled, while institutionalized forgiveness of the state by itself betrayed the m emory 
and reality of the violated — a suspended “we forgive but we don’t forget” facilitated 
a transitional approach to justice. But Eze questions whether transition is preferable 
to transformation, and whether such a reliance on spectacular forgiveness ultimately 
fails to address ongoing race/class inequalities.
Eze grants that his own view of public reason as secular, participatory citizenship 
is open to the charges “leveled against it by defenders of premodern primordialism 
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or a postmodern irony” (p. 246), but he finds that these positions slip toward the 
prophetic on the one hand and circular narratives about power on the other. The 
A fro-modern rationalist tradition thus necessarily courses “between” such positions, 
while opposing suggestions that, if in Africa science, religion, art, philosophy, and 
morality sometimes blend together, Africa is therefore “unphilosophical.” Philoso-
phy, rather, should defend ordinary reason as the locus for restorative and transforma-
tional justice without “resorting to the spectacular tactics of most religious, artistic, 
and political movements in Africa” (p. 248). And it is in respect to this non- 
extraordinary understanding of struggle that “philosophy’s own reason” should be 
pursued (p. 228).
Eze’s injunction that philosophy begin where it is, and that it prize in vernacular 
traditions and local epistemologies their quiddity as forms of universal reason, strikes 
me as remarkably useful for postcolonial philosophy to the degree that it does not 
again “foreclose the aboriginal” in the name of a democracy-to-come. In Hawai‘i, 
where this essay was written, Eze’s approach to reconciliation, healing, and transfor-
mative justice might well be productively debated as a means of readdressing the 
illegal theft of Hawaiian sovereignty and the ongoing occupation by the American 
state, though to treat these issues as a philosophical problem of reason would cer-
tainly invite the gamut of challenges that On Reason anticipates. Those he considers 
as “tight culturalists” might regard any suggestion for relaxing core claims as simply 
an “indecent proposal” (p. 149). “Loose culturalists” might agree that kānaka maoli 
(native Hawaiians) have at all points in recorded history engaged in ordinary or 
p ractical reason (the crux of Gananath Obeyesekere’s argument against Marshall 
sahlins), while disagreeing that philosophy and religion/spirituality can or should 
therefore be even provisionally separated.4 Thus, as committed as Eze is to seeing the 
reasoning agent as embodied in history and entitled to self-determination on “conti-
nuity of culture,” his argument might not allow true flexibility on these points. He 
would in the end have to insist that if ordinary reason is prioritized as a way of redi-
recting the rationales that sustain the cultural conflict and racism that colonialism 
created and exploits, it cannot as philosophy afford the exceptionalist aspects of 
tight-culturalist politics. In a plural society, he argues, scriptural arguments defend 
only the outlooks of believers.
In other words, to conduct the kind of thought experiment in Hawai‘i that Eze 
encourages at several points in On Reason would seem to require imposing condi-
tions. For cultural precedent to inform public policy it would have to be seen as a 
reasoned renewal of ways of thinking about being in the world that affirm the prag-
matic value of indigenous philosophy for arriving at pono (correctness, justice, right, 
balance) and ho’oponopono (healing, making pono what is hewa [wrong]) while 
considering the well-being of non-kānaka maoli citizens. In turn, Eze’s conditions of 
reconciliation would require of settlers the meaningful unlearning of epistemic privi-
lege as a right of spoil and openness to ways of thinking that are underprivileged or 
foreclosed within the logics of the American state. The legal system that militarily 
defends these logics would have to be recognized as itself the agent of exceptionalist 
and quasi-religious, redemptive thinking, and the instrument of the dispossession of 
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kānaka maoli for the benefit of settlers. The workings of social institutions, in other 
words, would have to be reconfigured over time in such a way as to produce and 
support, not a dramatic, transitional, extraordinary justice (the exchange of land or 
cash reparations for forgiveness in a monumental deal involving the relinquishment 
of future claims, etc.), but a justice philosophically based on the reasoned transfor-
mation of the practices of everyday, ordinary life.
Notes
1   –   see John Pittman, “Reading Reason with Emmanuel Eze,” and Ifeanyi Menkiti, 
“On Rationality and the Burden of the Ijele Masquerade: A Note on Emmanuel 
Eze’s Work,” in “special Issue on Emmanuel Eze,” Symposia on Gender, Race 
and Philosophy, vol. 4 (spring 2008), http://web.mit.edu/sgrp (click on “A rchive”); 
Zekeh s. Gbotokum, “Comments on E. C. Eze’s “Between History and the Gods: 
Reason, Morality, and Politics in Today’s Africa,” and Elias K. Bongmba, “Beyond 
Reason to Interdisciplinary Dialogue on Morality and Politics in Africa: Com-
ments on E. C. Eze’s ‘Between History and the Gods: Reason, Morality, and 
Politics in Today’s Africa,’” in Africa Today 55 (2): 95–104; and Bruce Jenz, “Rea-
son and Rationality in Eze’s On Reason,” South African Journal of Philosophy 27 
(4): 296–308.
2   –   Gayatri Chakravorty spivak, A Critique of Postcolonial Reason: Toward a History 
of the Vanishing Present (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1999), p. ix. In 
Death of a Discipline (New York: Columbia University Press, 2003), spivak 
d escribes the “new comparativism” as a shift away from the Area studies’ model 
of the subject, which historically defaults to national/regional norms. Without 
abandoning the reading practices, erudition, and commitment to languages that 
developed within this model, spivak urges both a reconception of the subject 
(whose often mobile and always raced/gendered position must be tracked “with-
out foregone conclusions” and less from “language to language” than from “body 
to ethical semiosis” [p. 13]) and attentiveness to the conditions of possibility that 
sanction the authority of those who speak on the subject’s behalf, whether the 
subject is an individual or a collectivity.
3   –   Eze’s argument in this sense turns away from debates about ethnophilosophy in 
Africa, which Paulin Hountondji describes as a false alternative to putative irra-
tionality that tends toward a reductiveness ironically driven by the methodolo-
gies of Eurocentric ethnology and serving its ends (Paulin J. Hountondji, The 
Struggle for Meaning: Reflections on Philosophy, Culture, and Democracy in 
Africa, trans. John Conteh-Morgan [Athens, OH: Ohio University Center for 
I nternational studies, 2002], p. 91). As in the works of Kwasi Wiredu, Eze’s direc-
tive regarding the universal/particularlist problematic is on how thinkers might 
“combine insights extracted from [East and West philosophical sources] with 
those gained from . . . indigenous philosophical resources to create for ourselves 
and our peoples modern philosophies from which both the East and West might 
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learn something” (Kwasi Wiredu, Cultural Universals and Particulars: An African 
Perspective [Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1996], p. 153).
4   –   Obeyesekere argued that a perceiver’s embeddedness in culture does not “ren-
der discrimination impossible” (Gananath Obeyesekere, The Apotheosis of 
C aptain Cook: European Mythmaking in the Pacific [Princeton: Princeton Uni-
versity Press, 1992], p. 21); sahlins countered with “different cultures, different 
rationalities” — that to assume a “commonsense bourgeois realism” was to retro-
actively impose the Enlightenment view of rationality brought by Cook (Marshall 
David sahlins, How ‘Natives’ Think: About Captain Cook, for Example [Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 1995], p. 14). John Charlot stresses that, while in 
classical Hawaiian thought there was no “dualism between the material and 
i mmaterial,” this did not attenuate the autonomy of reason in contemplating and 
modifying the world ( John Charlot, Classical Hawaiian Education: Generations 
of Hawaiian Culture [Lā‘ie, HI: The Pacific Institute, Brigham Young University, 
2005], p. 90). In the fullest contemporary reconstruction of kānaka maoli phi-
losophy, Manulani Aluli Meyer engages pragmatism and empiricism to discover 
“fundamental principles of knowing,” which include “instinctive, innate or 
a ncestral knowledge” (Manulani Aluli Meyer, Ho‘oulu: Our Time of Becoming: 
Hawaiian Epistemology and Early Writings [Honolulu: ‘Ai Pōhaku Press, 2003], 
p. 78) as part of a “triangulation of meaning” (see Meyer, “Indigenous and 
A uthentic: Hawaiian Epistemology and the Triangulation of Meaning,” in Hand-
book of Critical and Indigenous Methodologies, ed. Norman K. Denzin, Yvonna 
s. Lincoln, and Linda Tuhiwai smith [Los Angeles: sage Publications, 2008], pp. 
217–233).
Talk about “Barbarians” in Antiquity
Michael Nylan
History Department, University of California at Berkeley
Rethinking the Other in Antiquity. By Erich s. Gruen. Princeton: Princeton University 
Press, 2011. Pp. xiv + 415.
A new book in the field of Greek and Roman Classics has important implications for 
serious students of early and middle-period China as well.1 As its title suggests, 
R ethinking the Other in Antiquity by Erich s. Gruen calls into question one of the 
reigning paradigms used by historians of the classical era,2 asking whether scholars 
have not been over-eager to retroject postcolonial notions of the Other (the dispar-
aged, disdained, demonized, and even subhuman)3 onto the antique world. To be 
clear at the outset: Gruen’s book does not offer a blanket condemnation of p ostmodern 
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